ARTicles: Rene -- An Open Letter to the 9/11 Panel

I have never fully understood this investigation and what the real motives were.
Security can only come through changes in policy, not only within the intelligence community, but also (and more importantly if we follow the logic that things can be changed through reform) in the policies of the US towards countries in the Middle East (and of course other parts of the world).

The panel of five Republicans and five Democrats does appear to have recommended reshaping foreign policy with a "preventive strategy that is as much, or more, political as it is military" but it did so in such a way that substantive issues like the War in Iraq and the Occupation of Palestine by Israel are not addressed.

This open letter to the panel is interesting, it comes from an insider, a former FBI translator, thus much of it, of course focuses on the intelligence problems that were actually a part of the mandate of the commission. Nevertheless, toward the end, you understand that the two are actually not apart, the "failures" in intelligence are actually also a victim of the same foreign policy, the same convictions to "business as usual" which have created, supported, and legitimized (in the eyes of millions), the space for the types of attacks we saw on 9-11.

-rg

Sibel writes:

the full text is below:

August 2, 2004
An Open Letter to the 9/11 Panel
by Sibel Edmonds

Find this article at:
http://www.antiwar.com/orig/s-edmonds.php

Thomas Kean, Chairman
National Committee on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States
301 7th Street, SW
Room 5125
Washington, D.C. 20407

Dear Chairman Kean:

It has been almost three years since the terrorist attacks on Sept. 11,
during which time we have been placed under a constant threat of terror and
asked to exercise vigilance in our daily lives. Your commission was created
by law to investigate "facts and circumstances related to the terrorist
attacks of September 11, 2001" and to "provide recommendations to safeguard
against future acts of terrorism," and has now issued its "9/11 Commission
Report" [pdf]. You are now asking us to pledge our support for this report
and its recommendations with our tax money, our security and our lives.
Unfortunately, I find your report seriously flawed in its failure to address
serious intelligence issues that I, as a witness to the commission, made you
aware of. Thus, I must assume that other serious issues I am not aware of
were also omitted from your report. These omissions cast doubt on the
validity of your report and therefore on its conclusions and
recommendations. Considering what is at stake - our national security - we
are entitled to demand answers to unanswered questions, and to ask for
clarification of issues that were ignored and omitted from the report. I,
Sibel Edmonds, a concerned American citizen, a former FBI translator, a
whistleblower, a witness for a United States Congressional investigation, a
witness and a plaintiff for the Department of Justice Inspector General
investigation and a witness for your own 9/11 Commission, request your
response to the following questions and issues.

After the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, we, the translators at the FBI's
largest and most important translation unit, were told to slow down or even
stop translation of critical information related to terrorist activities so
that the FBI could present the United States Congress with a record of an
"extensive backlog of untranslated documents" and justify its request for
budget and staff increases. While FBI agents from various field offices were
desperately seeking leads and suspects, and completely depending on FBI HQ
and its language units to provide them with needed translations, hundreds of
translators were being told by their administrative supervisors not to
translate and to let the work pile up (please refer to the CBS 60 Minutes
transcript from October 2002 provided to your investigators in
January-February 2004). This issue has been confirmed by the Senate
Judiciary Committee (please refer to Sen. Grassley's and Sen. Leahy's
letters during the summer of 2002, provided to your investigators in
January-February 2004). Apparently, this confirmed report has been
substantiated by the Department of Justice Inspector General Report (please
refer to DOJ-IG report "Re: Sibel Edmonds and FBI Translation," provided to
you prior to the completion of your report). I provided your investigators
with a detailed acount of this issue and the names of other witnesses
willing to corroborate this (please refer to tape-recorded 3.5 hours
testimony by Sibel Edmonds, provided to your investigators on Feb. 11,
2004).

Today, almost three years after 9/11, and more than two years since this
information has been confirmed and made available to our government, the
administrators in charge of language departments of the FBI remain in their
positions and in charge of the information front lines of the FBI's
counterterrorism and counterintelligence efforts. Your report omits any
reference to this most serious issue, foregoing any accountability
whatsoever, and your recommendations refrain from addressing this issue,
which will have even more serious consequences. This issue is systemic and
departmental. Why does your report exclude this information despite the
evidence and briefings you received? How can budget increases address and
resolve this misconduct by mid-level bureaucratic management? How can the
addition of a new bureaucrat, the "intelligence czar," in a cocoon away from
the action, address and resolve this problem?

Melek Can Dickerson, a Turkish translator, was hired by the FBI after Sept.
11 and placed in charge of translating the most sensitive information
related to terrorists and criminals under the Bureau's investigation.
Dickerson was granted top secret clearance, which can be granted only after
conducting a thorough background investigation. Dickerson used to work for
semi-legit organizations that were FBI targets of investigation. She had
ongoing relationships with two individuals who were FBI targets of
investigation. For months, Dickerson blocked all-important information
related to these semi-legit organizations and the individuals she and her
husband associated with. She stamped hundreds, if not thousands, of
documents related to these targets as "not pertinent." Dickerson attempted
to prevent others from translating these documents important to the FBI's
investigations and our fight against terrorism. With the assistance of her
direct supervisor, Mike Feghali, she took hundreds of pages of top-secret
intelligence documents outside the FBI to unknown recipients. With Feghali's
assistance, she forged signatures on top-secret documents related to 9/11
detainees. After all these incidents were confirmed and reported to FBI
management, Melek Can Dickerson was allowed to remain in her position, to
continue the translation of sensitive intelligence received by the FBI, and
to maintain her top-secret clearance. Apparently bureaucratic mid-level FBI
management and administrators decided that it would not look good for the
Bureau to have this security breach and espionage case investigated and
publicized, especially after the Robert Hanssen scandal. The Melek Can
Dickerson case was confirmed by the Senate Judiciary Committee. It received
major coverage by the press. According to Director Robert Mueller, the
inspector general criticized the FBI for failing to adequately pursue the
espionage report on Melek Can Dickerson. I provided your investigators with
a detailed and specific account of this issue, the names of other witnesses
willing to corroborate this, and additional documents.

Today, more than two years since the Dickerson incident was reported to the
FBI, and more than two years since this information was confirmed by the
United States Congress and reported by the press, the same people remain in
charge of translation quality and security. Dickerson and several FBI
targets of investigation hastily left the United States in 2002, and no
criminal investigation has been opened. Not only does the supervisor who
facilitated this criminal conduct remain in a supervisory position, he has
been promoted to supervising Arabic language units of the FBI's
counterterrorism and counterintelligence investigations. Your report omits
these significant incidents, and your recommendations do not address this
serious security breach and likely espionage issue. This issue needs to be
investigated and prosecuted. The translation of our intelligence is being
entrusted to individuals with loyalties to our enemies. Important
"chit-chats" and "chatters" are being intentionally blocked from
translation. Why does your report exclude this information and these serious
issues despite the evidence and briefings you received? How can budget
increases address and resolve this misconduct by mid-level bureaucratic
management? How can the addition of an "intelligence czar" solve this
problem?

More than four months prior to the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks, in April
2001, a long-term FBI informant/asset who had been providing the bureau with
information since 1990, provided two FBI agents and a translator with
specific information regarding a terrorist attack being planned by Osama bin
Laden. This asset/informant was previously a high-level intelligence officer
in Iran in charge of intelligence from Afghanistan. Through his contacts in
Afghanistan, he received information that: 1) Osama bin Laden was planning a
major terrorist attack in the United States targeting four or five major
cities; 2) the attack was going to involve airplanes; 3) some of the
individuals in charge of carrying out this attack were already in place in
the United States; 4) the attack was going to be carried out soon, in a few
months. The agents who received this information reported it to their
superior, Special Agent in Charge of Counterterrorism Thomas Frields at the
FBI Washington Field Office, by filing 302 forms, and the translator
translated and documented this information. No action was taken by the
special agent in charge, and after 9/11 the agents and the translators were
told to "keep quiet" regarding this issue. The translator who was present
during the session with the FBI informant, Mr. Behrooz Sarshar, reported
this incident to Director Mueller in writing, and later to the Department of
Justice Inspector General. The press reported this incident, and a report in
the Chicago Tribune on July 21, 2004, stated that FBI officials had
confirmed that this information was received in April 2001. Furthermore, the
Chicago Tribune quoted an aide to Director Mueller saying that Mueller was
surprised that the Commission never raised this particular issue with him
during the hearing. Mr. Sarshar reported this issue to your investigators on
Feb. 12, 2004, and provided them with specific dates, locations, witness
names, and contact information for that particular Iranian asset and the two
special agents who received the information (please refer to the
tape-recorded testimony provided by Mr. Sarshar on February 12, 2004 and
given to your investigators). I provided your investigators with a detailed
and specific account of this issue, the names of other witnesses, and
documents I had seen. Mr. Sarshar also provided the Department of Justice
Inspector General with specific information regarding this issue (please
refer to DOJ-IG report "Re: Sibel Edmonds and FBI Translation," provided to
you prior to the completion of your report).

Almost three years after Sept. 11, many officials still refuse to admit to
having specific information regarding the terrorists' plans to attack the
United States. The Phoenix Memo, received months prior to the 9/11 attacks,
specifically warned FBI HQ of pilot training and its possible link to
terrorist activities against the United States. Four months prior to the
terrorist attacks, the Iranian asset provided the FBI with specific
information regarding the "use of airplanes," "major U.S. cities as
targets," and "Osama bin Laden issuing the order." Coleen Rowley likewise
reported that specific information had been provided to FBI HQ. All this
information went to the same place: FBI Headquarters in Washington, D.C.,
and the FBI Washington Field Office in Washington, D.C. Yet your report
claims that not having a central place where all intelligence could be
gathered was one of the main factors in our intelligence failure. Why does
your report exclude the information regarding the Iranian asset and Behrooz
Sarshar from its timeline of missed opportunities? Why was this significant
incident not mentioned, despite the public confirmation by the FBI,
witnesses provided to your investigators, and briefings you received
directly? Why did you surprise even Director Mueller by not asking him
questions regarding this significant incident? (Please remember that you ran
out of questions to ask during your hearings with Director Mueller and AG
John Ashcroft, so please do not cite a "time limit.") How can budget
increases remedy the failures of mid-level bureaucrats at FBI Headquarters?
How can the addition of an "intelligence czar" fix this problem?

Over two years ago, and after two unclassified sessions with FBI officials,
the Senate Judiciary Committee sent letters to Director Mueller, Attorney
General Ashcroft, and Inspector General Glenn Fine regarding the existence
of unqualified translators in charge of translating high-level sensitive
intelligence. The FBI confirmed at least one case: Kevin Taskesen, a Turkish
translator, had been given a job as an FBI translator, despite the fact that
he had failed all FBI language proficiency tests. In fact, Kevin could not
understand or speak even elementary-level English. He had failed English
proficiency tests and did not even score sufficiently in the target
language. Still, Kevin Taskesen was hired, not due to a lack of other
qualified translator candidates, but because his wife worked at FBI HQ as a
language proficiency exam administrator. Almost everyone at FBI HQ and the
FBI Washington Field Office knew about Kevin. Yet, Kevin was given the task
of translating the most sensitive terrorist-related information, and he was
sent to Guantanamo Bay to translate the interrogation of and information for
all Turkic language detainees (Turks, Uzbeks, Turkmens, etc.). The FBI was
supposed to be trying to obtain information regarding possible future attack
plans from these detainees, yet the FBI knowingly sent unqualified
translators to gather and translate this information. Furthermore, these
detainees were either released, detained or prosecuted based on translations
by unqualified translators knowingly sent there by the FBI. Sen. Grassley
and Sen. Leahy publicly confirmed Kevin Taskesen's case (please refer to
Senate letters and documents provided to your investigators in
January-February 2004). The program 60 Minutes showed Kevin's picture and
listed him as one of the unqualified translators sent to Guantanamo Bay, as
confirmed by the FBI. The Department of Justice Inspector General provided a
detailed account of these problems. I provided your investigators with a
specific account of this issue and the names of other witnesses willing to
corroborate this.

After over two years since Kevin Taskesen's case was publicly confirmed, and
after almost two years since 60 Minutes broadcast Taskesen's case, Kevin
Taskesen remains in his position as sole Turkish and Turkic language
translator for the FBI Washington Field Office. After admitting that Kevin
Taskesen was not qualified to translate sensitive intelligence and
investigation of terrorist activities, the FBI still keeps him in charge of
translating highly sensitive documents and leads. Those individuals in the
FBI hiring department who facilitated the hiring of unqualified translators
due to nepotism/cronyism remain in their positions. Yet your report does not
mention this case or the chronic problems within the FBI translation, hiring
and screening departments. Accountability for those responsible for these
practices that endanger our national security is not brought up even once in
your report. Why does your report exclude these serious issues despite the
evidence and briefings you received?

In October 2001, approximately one month after the Sept. 11 attack, an agent
returned a certain document to the FBI Washington Field Office to have it
re-translated. This special agent rightfully believed that, considering the
suspect under surveillance and the issues involved, the original translation
might have missed information that could prove valuable in the investigation
of terrorist activities. After this document was received by the FBI
Washington Field Office and re-translated verbatim, the field agent's hunch
appeared to be correct. The new translation revealed certain information
regarding blueprints, pictures and building material for skyscrapers being
sent overseas. It also revealed illegal activities in obtaining visas from
certain embassies in the Middle East through network contacts and bribery.
However, after the re-translation was completed and the new significant
information revealed, the unit supervisor in charge of certain Middle
Eastern languages, Mike Feghali, decided NOT to send the re-translated
information to the special agent who had requested it. Instead, Feghali sent
the agent a note stating that the translation was reviewed and that the
original translation was accurate. Feghali argued that sending the accurate
translation would hurt the original translator and would cause problems for
the FBI language department. The special agent never received an accurate
translation of that document. I provided your investigators with a detailed
and specific account of this issue, the name and date of this particular
investigation, and the names of other witnesses willing to corroborate this.
This information was also provided to the Department of Justice Inspector
General.

Only one month after the catastrophic events of Sept. 11, while many agents
were working around the clock to obtain leads and information, the
bureaucratic administrators in the FBI's largest and most important
translation unit were covering up their past failures, blocking important
leads and information, and jeopardizing ongoing terrorist investigations.
The supervisor involved in this incident, Mike Feghali, was in charge of
important Middle Eastern languages within the FBI Washington Field Office,
and had a record of previous misconduct. After this supervisor's prior
misconduct was reported to the FBI's higher-level management, the Inspector
General's Office, the United States Congress, and the 9/11 Commission, he
was promoted to supervisor of the FBI's Arabic language unit. Today, Mike
Feghali remains in the FBI Washington Field Office and is in charge of a
language unit receiving the chit-chat that our color-coded threat system is
based upon. Yet your report contains zero information regarding these
systemic problems that led us to our failure in preventing the 9/11
terrorist attacks. In your report, there are no references to individuals
responsible for hindering past and current investigations, or those who are
willing to compromise our security and our lives for their career
advancement and security. Why does your report exclude this information
despite all the evidence and briefings you received?

The latest buzz topic regarding intelligence is the problem of sharing
information within and between intelligence agencies. The public has still
not been told of the intentional obstruction of intelligence. The public has
not been told that certain information, despite its relevance to terrorist
activities, is not shared with counterterrorism units. This was true prior
to 9/11, and it remains true today. If counterintelligence receives
information about terrorism that implicates certain nations, semi-legit
organizations or the politically powerful in this country, then that
information is not shared with counterterrorism, regardless of the
consequences. In certain cases, frustrated FBI agents have cited "direct
pressure by the State Department." The Department of Justice Inspector
General received detailed evidence regarding this issue. I provided your
investigators with an account of this issue, the names of other witnesses
willing to corroborate this, and the names of U.S. officials involved in
these transactions and activities.

After almost three years, the American people still do not know that
thousands of lives are jeopardized under apolicy of "protecting certain
foreign business relations." The victims' family members still do not
realize that answers they have sought relentlessly for over two years have
been blocked in the interest of "safeguarding certain diplomatic relations."
Your hearings and your report did not even attempt to address these
unspoken, unwritten practices, although, unlike me, you were not placed
under any gag. Despite your full awareness of criminal conduct by high-level
government employees, you have not proposed criminal investigations, even
though you are required to do so. How can budget increases resolve these
problems when some of them are caused by unspoken practices and unwritten
policies? How can an "intelligence czar" override these policies and
practices?

I know for a fact that intelligence translation cannot be brushed off as a
relatively insignificant issue. Translation units are the frontline in
gathering, translating and disseminating intelligence. A warning in advance
of the next terrorist attack will probably come in the form of a text in a
foreign language that will have to be translated. That message may be given
to a translation unit headed by someone like Mike Feghali, who slows down -
even stops - translations for the purpose of receiving budget increases for
his department, who has participated in criminal activities and security
breaches, and who has covered up failures and criminal conduct within the
department. That message may go to an unqualified translator such as Kevin
Taskesen, so it may never be translated correctly and acted upon. That
message may go to an agent of a foreign organization who works as an FBI
translator. If an attack then occurs, one that could have been prevented by
acting on information in that message, who will tell the families of the
victims that nothing more could have been done? There will be no excuse that
we did not know, because we do know.

I am writing this letter in light of my direct experience within the FBI's
translation unit in the crucial months after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, and
in light of my firsthand knowledge of certain cases within the Bureau's
language units. As you are fully aware, the problems cited in this letter
are by no means based upon personal opinion or unverified allegations. As
you are fully aware, these issues and incidents have been confirmed by a
senior Republican senator, Charles Grassley, and a senior Democrat senator,
Patrick Leahy. As you know, according to officials with direct knowledge of
the Department of Justice Inspector General's report on my allegations,
"none of [my] allegations were disproved." As you are fully aware, even FBI
officials "confirmed all [my] allegations and denied none" during their
unclassified meetings with the Senate Judiciary staff over two years ago.
However, your commission's hearings, 567-page report and recommendations do
not include these serious issues, major incidents and systemic problems.
Your report's coverage of FBI translation problems consists of a brief
microscopic footnote (Footnote #25). Yet your commission is geared to start
aggressively pressuring our government to hastily implement your measures
and recommendations based upon an incomplete and deficient report.

In order to cure a problem, one must have an accurate diagnosis. In order to
correctly diagnose a problem, one must consider and take into account all
visible symptoms. Your Commission's investigations, hearings and report have
disregarded many visible symptoms. I am emphasizing "visible" because these
symptoms have been long recognized by experts from the intelligence
community and have been written about in the press. I am emphasizing
"visible" because the specific symptoms I provided you with in this letter
have been confirmed and publicly acknowledged. During its many hearings your
commission chose not to ask the questions necessary to unveil the true
symptoms of our failed intelligence system. Your Commission intentionally
bypassed these severe symptoms and chose not to include them in its 567-page
report. Now, without a complete list of our failures pre-9/11, without a
comprehensive examination of true symptoms that exist in our intelligence
system, without assigning any accountability whatsoever and, therefore,
without a sound and reliable diagnosis, your commission is attempting to
divert attention from the real problems and to prescribe a cure through
hasty and costly measures. It is like putting a gold-lined porcelain cap
over a deeply decayed tooth without first treating the root.

Respectfully,

Sibel D. Edmonds