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Informal
integration
"In
general, informal cooperation in East Asia has been based on three
yuan (special relationships): ethnic ties, industrial linkages and
geographical proximity . All three types of informal integration share
several features. They are all 1) Market driven. Whatever the linkages
are, it is the economic returns that ultimately lead to the formation
of the informal integration. Other factors only facilitate the integration.
This is different from formal integration, where many decisions are
politics-driven. 2) Privately-sponsored. In all cases of informal
integration, the actual integrative activities have been conducted
by private firms. 3) Network-based. East Asia is a region where intergovernmental
cooperation has been lacking. But privately, all kinds of networks
have developed among Asians in different countries. At the macrolevel,
there are production networks and ethnic business networks. At the
micro-level, these two major networks consist of numerous networks
formed through long-term corporate ties, (real or imaginary) kinship,
voluntary organizations, etc . 4) Non-institutional. Integration through
the informal mechanisms does not rely on formal international organizations.
In many cases it is even non-contractual. Therefore informal integration
involves much lower transaction costs than formal cooperation and
is much easier to materialize .
Despite the substantial reductions in trade barriers over the past
two decades in most East Asian countries, East Asia still has very
strong informal trade barriers. Formal economic cooperation is particularly
impotent in dealing with those "subjective resistances"
to trade. But informal integration can be an effective way to get
around those barriers. The RPN [Regional Production Network] creates
structural dependence of the lower-tier economies on the higher-tier
ones, so that Japan can maintain high trade surpluses with East Asian
countries, despite the substantial trade protection (mostly non-tariff)
of those markets.
For Japan, establishing a regional production network through the
informal multi-tier division of labor is preferable to establishing
a formal exclusive regional free trade area in East Asia. Other than
causing suspicions from other East Asian countries, a Japan-led formal
East Asian bloc would also certainly alienate the United States, on
which much of Japan's export depends. An invisible "bloc"
will enable Japan to play a major role in Asia while keeping a relatively
low profile."
[Excerpts from Dajin Peng, "The changing nature of East Asia
as an economic region," Pacific
Affairs, Summer 2000, text
here]
As
economic integration progressed institutionally (at the government
level) in Europe and North America, it was happening as a matter of
course in Asia, as companies themselves built cross-border dynamic
divisions of labor. Regarding this point, Professor Fukunari Kimura
of Keio University said, ?An international network of production and
distribution has been created in East Asia in the past decade, centering
on the electric and electronic sectors. A production network on this
scale is unseen on the American Continent or in Europe.? From 1985
to 2003, global trade grew four times in value. Surprisingly, the
value of regional trade in East Asia, comprising Japan, China, the
Republic of Korea, Hong Kong, Taiwan and ASEAN countries, surged 7.8
times, or nearly double the growth in global trade during the same
period. The move in the region is now toward concluding free trade
agreements (FTAs) and economic partnership agreements (EPAs). It is
my feeling that an ?East Asian Free Business Zone? will be a reality
by as early as 2010. This progression is similar to how Canada, the
United States and Mexico eventually became linked through NAFTA.?
[Excerpt from the keynote speech of Osamu Watanabe, Chairman and CEO
of the Japan External Trade Organization, at the JETRO-International
Trade Canada Investment Seminar in Toronto, Canada, May 27, 2005,
text
as PDF]
Neoliberalism
?Politics, and with it, all the other dimensions of contemporary experience,
is subject to an economic rationality. To put it another way, the
human being is entirely conceived as homo oeconomicus, and all the
dimensions of existence are shaped by market rationality. Consequently,
every action and every political decision obeys considerations of
profitability, and, what is equally important, every human or institutional
action is conceived as the rational action of a businessman, based
on a calculation of usefulness, gainfulness and satisfaction, in accord
with a morally neutral micro-economic analysis whose variables are
rarity, supply and demand. Not only does neoliberalism conceive everything
in social, cultural and political life as reducible to such a calculation,
but it also develops the institutional practices and rewards that
allow its conception to be fulfilled. In other words, the discourse
and politics that convey its criteria are what allow neoliberalism
to fashion rational actors and decision-making processes that are
guided, in every domain, by the logic of the marketplace. One thing
must therefore be stressed: in its effort to promulgate economic rationality,
neoliberalism is more normative than ontological; and for this reason
it proposes an institutional framework, a series of political measures
and a discourse. Neoliberalism is a constructivist project: for it,
the strict application of economic rationality to all walks of society
is not an ontological given; therefore it actively works towards the
development, dissemination and institutionalization of that rationality.?
[Excerpt from Wendy Brown, "Néolibéralisme et fin de la démocratie,"
Vacarme n° 29]
Overaccumulation
Crisis
"The basic idea of the spatio-temporal fix is simple enough.
Overaccumulation within a given territorial system means a condition
of surpluses of labour (rising unemployment) and surpluses of capital
(registered as a glut of commodities on the market that cannot be
disposed of without a loss, as idle productive capacity and/or as
surpluses of money capital lacking outlets for productive and profitable
investment). Such surpluses can be potentially absorbed by (a)
temporal displacement through investment in long-term capital projects
or social expenditures (such as education and research) that defer
the reentry of capital values into circulation into the future, (b)
spatial displacements through opening up new markets, new production
capacities and new resource, social and labour possibilities elsewhere,
or (c) some combination of (a)
and (b) .
The general picture which then emerges, is of a networked spatio-temporal
world of financial flows of surplus capital with conglomerations of
political and economic power at key nodal points (New York, London,
Tokyo) seeking either to disburse and absorb the surpluses down productive
paths, more often than not in long-term projects across a variety
of spaces (from Bangladesh to Brazil or China), or to use speculative
power to rid the system of overaccumulation by the visitation of crises
of devaluation upon vulnerable territories. It is of course the populations
of those vulnerable territories who then must pay the inevitable price,
in terms of loss of assets, loss of jobs, and loss of economic security,
to say nothing of the loss of dignity and hope . Capitalism survives,
therefore, not only through a series of spatio-temporal fixes that
absorb the capital surpluses in productive and constructive ways,
but also through the devaluation and destruction administered as corrective
medicine to what is generally depicted as the fiscal profligacy of
those who borrow. The very idea that those who irresponsibly lend
might also be held responsible is, of course, dismissed out of hand
by ruling elites .
In the current conjuncture, an obvious candidate to absorb surplus
capital is China . Net foreign direct investment rose from $5 billion
in 1991 to around $50 billion in 2002 . Since 1998, the Chinese have
sought to absorb their vast labour surpluses (and to curb the threat
of social unrest) by debt-financed investment in huge mega-projects
that dwarf the already huge Three Gorges dam . This effort is far
larger in toto than that
which the United States undertook during the 1950s and 1960s, and
has the potential to absorb surpluses of capital for several years
to come. It is, however, deficit-financed, and that entails huge risks
since if the investments do not return their value to the accumulation
process in due course, then a fiscal crisis of the state will quickly
engulf China with serious consequences for economic development and
social stability. Nevertheless, this proposes to be a remarkable version
of a spatio-temporal fix that has global implications not only for
absorbing overaccumulated capital, but also for shifting the balance
of economic and political power to China as the regional hegemon and
perhaps placing the Asian region, under Chinese leadership, in a much
more competitive position vis-à-vis the United States .
A second possible outcome, however, is increasingly fierce international
competition as multiple dynamic centres of capital accumulation compete
on the world stage in the face of strong currents of overaccumulation.
Since they cannot all succeed in the long run, either the weakest
succumb and fall into serious crises of localized devaluation or geopolitical
struggles arise between regions. The latter can get converted via
the territorial logic of power into confrontations between states
in the form of trade wars and currency wars, with the ever-present
danger of military confrontations (of the sort that gave us two world
wars in the twentieth century) "
[Excerpts from David Harvey, The
New Imperialism (Oxford UP, 2003/2005), pp. 109, 134-35, 123-24.]
Polanyi's
double movement
"For a century the dynamics of modern society was governed by
a double movement: the market expanded continuously but this movement
was met by a countermovement checking the expansion in definite directions.
Vital though such a countermovement was for the protection of society,
in the last analysis it was incompatible with the self-regulation
of the market, and thus with the market system itself.
That system developed in leaps and bounds; it engulfed space and time,
and by creating bank money it produced a dynamic hitherto unknown.
By the time it reached its maximum extent, around 1914, every part
of the globe, all its inhabitants and yet unborn generations, physical
persons as well as huge fictitious bodies called corporations, were
comprised in it. A new way of life spread over the planet with a claim
to universality unparalleled since the age when Christianity started
out on its career, only this time the movement was on a purely material
level.
Yet simultaneously a countermovement was on foot. This was more than
the usual defensive behavior of society faced with change; it was
a reaction against a dislocation which attacked the fabric of society,
and which would have destroyed the very organization of production
that the market had called into being."
[Excerpt from Karl Polanyi, The
Great Transformation (Boston: Beacon, 1945/2001), p. 136]
Subjectivation
"The study of subjectivation is inseparable from the conception
of modernity as subject to the continual expansion of the rationalization
process, i.e. the expansion of coordination, planning and prediction
into all the spheres of social life (from economy to law, from politics
to art, as Weber indicated). Against the backdrop of this movement
toward social control arises the fundamental problem of subjectivation:
How to imagine a possibility of human emancipation?....
The earliest major study of subjectivation associates the notion of
a collective subject with the project of emancipation.... Faced with
capitalist exploitation and the alienation it engenders (rationalization),
a particular actor stands forth: the proletariat, identified as the
collective subject of history and invested with a universal mission
of emancipation.... For [Lukacs], as for all of Western Marxism, and
indeed for most thinking of emancipation until the 1970s, it was because
of the place it occupied within the productive process and because
of its class interests that the proletariat could apprehend society
as a totality. As compared with the bourgeoisie, "the superiority
of the proletariat must lie exclusively in its ability to see society
from the center as a coherent whole. This means that the proletariat
is able to act in such a way as to change reality; in the class consciousness
of the proletariat theory and practice coincide, and so it can consciously
throw the weight of its actions onto the scales of history" (Lucaks
1923, www.marxists.org/archive/lukacs/works/history/lukacs3.htm).
Yet this is an indirect superiority. To make it materialize, the proletariat
must go beyond the dispersion of events and the reification into which
it is plunged by the capitalist organization of production, and gain
access to its veritable consciousness and class mission. Only at this
price can the proletariat become the "identical subject-object
of history" (Lukacs, 1923). Put more simply: the proletariat
(via the Party) is the actor, the collective subject, wherein self-knowledge
can coincide with the knowledge of society as totality....
Today this language might seem like a joke. Nonetheless, it perfectly
describes the analytic structure of the entire matrix [of subjectivation]:
a principle of domination (here, the reification engendered by capitalism)
and a principle of emancipation organized around a collective subject
(here, the proletariat)... The action of a subject of history (the
bourgeoisie or the proletariat, then later, many other social groups
? including ethnic minorities, the Third World, women, students...)
always formed the narrative through which this possibility was explored.
This perspective was to undergo a rupture in the 60s and 70s. What
was called "the death of the subject" (in various senses
of the word) led to the more or less definitive exhaustion of the
positive formulation of subjectivation. ... With this weakening the
normative, emancipatory substrate on which the collective project
of subjectivation rested, its negative side took center stage, leading
to a more pessimistic and disenchanted vision. Domination could even
take on an insidious, all-embracing form that blocked off the possibility
of any kind of emancipatory subjectivation.
This displacement and reversal can be summed up as the "Foucaultian
moment," which itself is marked by two major turns. The first,
and no doubt the most important, transforms the collective and emancipatory
project of subjectivation into an individualizing process of subjection.
The subject becomes an effect of power; s/he is the result of the
full set of "the insidious leniencies, unavowable petty cruelties,
small acts of cunning, calculated methods, techniques, 'sciences'
that permit the fabrication of the disciplinary individual" (Foucault,
1975). ... But the "Foucaultian moment" does not only signal
the radically critical exit from the emancipatory version of the collective
subject, and the advent of an absolute reign of subjection; it also
marks a problematic and sometimes uncertain opening to individual
subjectivation. Indeed, this is the fundamental paradox of his work:
his constant will to demonstrate increasing power and subjection,
and his less evident but no less constant will to envisage a possibility
of emancipation. Foucault's response, in the final phase of his intellectual
life, after a long detour through classical Antiquity up to the early
centuries of Christianity, consisted in identifying an ethical model
which constrains individuals to seek out, always in a singular way,
their own "technique of living." Each one must fin in him
or herself the way to behave, and above, to govern themselves. The
freedom to be attained is "more than non-slavery, more than a
release from servitude that would render the individual independent
from any exterior or interior constraint; in its full and positive
form, it is a power that one exercises over oneself through the power
one exercises over others" (Foucault, 1984, p. 93). ...
Returning in a quite critical way to the Marxist tradition, certain
[contemporary] authors attempt to establish a new link between the
dimensions of the historical and personal subjects, notably by studying
the possibilities for self-construction produced collectively in the
new social movements; but unlike the former Marxists, they take a
particular interest in individual realizations. It is often a matter
of demonstrating the extent to which a group of themes taken on by
the new social movements have become individual concerns and chances
for emancipation. Whether in the experiences of women, of sexual or
ethnic minorities, or in diverse explorations associated with the
counter-culture, it is always a matter of circumscribing the new forms
of personal fabrication of the self induced by the process of collective
subjectivation. Whatever the particular emphasis, it is therefore
always a matter of studying the relation between emancipation and
subjection. For the authors working in this perspective, it is simply
false to think that individuals can create their "own existence"
in a free or autonomous way. Subjectivation is always defined, directly
or indirectly, in relation to collective action, and it is therefore
inseparable from social conflict and power relations."
[Excerpts from Danilo Mertilucci, "Les trois voies de l'individu
sociologique" (Three Paths toward the Sociological Individual),
text
here]
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